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Citizens of Charleston watch
the Confederate bombardment
of Fort Sumter.

By Steve O’Neill

O

n December 20, 2010, some 300 people paid
$100 each to attend a “secession ball,” a
celebration of South Carolina’s secession from the
Union on the 150th anniversary of the event.
Billed by the event’s sponsor, the Sons of
Confederate Veterans, as “a joyous night of music,
dancing, food and drink,” the party was held at
Gaillard Auditorium in the heart of downtown
Charleston, only blocks from the site of the original
secession convention. Among the attendees were
prominent business leaders, several state legislators,
and a Charleston city councilman.
The gala, which included a theatrical
re-enactment of the signing of the Ordinance
of Secession, attracted extensive media attention.
It also drew 150 protestors, white and black, including the Rev. Joseph Darby, vice president of the
Charleston NAACP, who denounced the “celebrat[ion]
of a war which was fought for the right to maintain
slavery.” But Mark Simpson, a commander of the
Sons of Confederate Veterans, offered a different
view of the event — and of secession: “It was not
about slavery. . . . We honor the men who wore the

gray. We can understand what animated them
to defend their homes.”
The secession ball and accompanying protest
symbolized the ongoing divisions about the Civil War
— a contest that has never quite ended for Americans,
and that certainly tends to reignite passions when its
major anniversaries arrive. These latter-day battles are
not fought with bayonets and Dahlgren artillery but
with arguments about secession and the larger meaning
of the war.
The recent events in Charleston marked the start
of the Civil War sesquicentennial, which was officially
launched April 12 with a re-enactment of the firing on
Fort Sumter. So prepare yourself for four years of public
debate over the meaning of the war.
And as we prepare for the commemorations
of Manassas and Shiloh, Gettysburg and Vicksburg,
perhaps it makes sense to put these modern-day events
— the ones at the Gaillard Auditorium and the ones
to follow across the state and nation — into historical
context by examining some of the ways that the
memory and meaning of secession and the war have
changed over the years.
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Slavery & Secession
BROADER ISSUES in the culture of South Carolina, the South and the

nation have shaped how succeeding generations have viewed secession and
the war, while opening wide gaps between the way that historians have
explained events and the way the general public has remembered them.
The public memory of the war has
responded more to the hopes, needs and
fears of the last 150 years than the events
and evidence of the 1850s and 1860s, and
academic historians have had a somewhat
tangential role in shaping what people
“know” about secession and the causes
of the war. Some of that is surely the fault
of the academics, who too often have written
for one another rather than for the general
public, but a more powerful reason is that
historical memories rooted in strong emotions tend to overwhelm even the most
balanced and accurate scholarship.
Indeed, this has frequently been the
case on the question of secession in South
Carolina. The debate that pitted the
secession ball celebrants in Charleston
against the protestors is not mirrored in
how historians have interpreted secession
in the state. On the contrary, historians
have been united and clear in their understanding that South Carolina’s leadership
seceded to defend slavery.
To be sure, historians have been alert
to complexities when writing about secession.
And nearly all would agree that a host of other issues attached themselves
to those of slavery and abolition in South Carolina, among them property
as a defense of liberty, a sense of manly honor, and fear of a race war
sparked by abolition. Many of today’s historians would disagree on the
relative impact of these auxiliary issues, but none would omit slavery as
the chief cause of South Carolina’s decision to secede in December 1860.
The primary evidence is overwhelming, starting with the words
of the state’s leaders. They made their case in unambiguous language.
William Preston, a states’ rights advocate and president of South Carolina
College, said in 1860, “Cotton is not our king — slavery is our king. Slavery
is our truth. Slavery is our divine right.” Preston Brooks of Edgefield, infamous for his 1856 assault on Massachusetts Sen. Charles Sumner on the
floor of the Capitol, said bluntly, “We of the South have no politics but the
Negro.” Edward Bryan, a pamphleteer, demanded, “Give us slavery or give
us death!” A.G. McGrath, mayor of Charleston at the time of secession
and governor at the end of the war, said candidly in 1865, “Other considerations attached themselves to slavery; but they were merely incidents
to it; of themselves they could never have produced the same results.”
The Declaration of the Causes of Secession also pointed to slavery
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as the root cause. Written by Christopher Memminger and commissioned
by the convention upon the occasion of its unanimous vote to secede, the
document defended both slavery and the compact theory of government,
which holds that the Constitution established a compact among the
states, all of which maintained their right to
sovereignty. The document also asserted that
Lincoln’s Republicans intended to exclude
slavery from the territories and extinguish
slavery in the South, and cited unfair and
unconstitutional practices by the North
against slavery.
Is the Declaration of the Causes of
Secession a defense of constitutional principles
and liberty? Yes, on some level; but we must
be clear that it defends the liberty to freely
own slaves and the right to retrieve fugitive
slaves. Only a reader blinded by the need to
elevate high-minded principles over baser
motives could fail to see slavery as the basis
for Memminger’s justification.
On the question of states’ rights and
constitutional principles, the words of
historian David Duncan Wallace are helpful.
Wallace, a longtime Wofford professor, wrote
a seminal history of South Carolina in 1934.
He was born in Laurens County in the last
days of Reconstruction, and his writings make
clear that he was no liberal on race. About
secession in South Carolina, he wrote:
The theories for a constitutional defense were essentially practical.
If the slave-owner had faced dangerous opposition to slavery against
which only the federal government could protect him, then he
would have been expounding national sovereignty rather than state
sovereignty. The constitutional argument was a mere attorney’s
plea claiming everything for his client. . . . The secessionists knew
why they seceded and in the various secession conventions they
crowned endless reiterations of the cause with the strongest statements of the threat to slavery as the cause. It is hardly conceivable
that secession would have occurred if slavery had not existed.
To say that South Carolina seceded to defend slavery is not to say
that there is no more to learn about the state and the causes of the war,
or even about the state and secession. We can never retrieve the past
with perfect fidelity, so all the questions will never be answered. But
professional historians must cite verifiable evidence and make arguments
that will be scrutinized by their peers. In this context, explanations
about secession in South Carolina that leave out slavery are misguided,
if not thoroughly mistaken.

The ‘Lost Cause’ emerges
STILL, as the sesquicentennial
secession celebration in Charleston
seems to confirm, some remain
convinced that secession was
fundamentally a quest for selfgovernment and defense of
liberty, and not concerned
with defending slavery.
How did we move from
the frank admissions of the
1850s and 1860s to explanations
that de-emphasize slavery? The
transformation is rooted in specific
events during and after the war.
The South suffered devastating losses on the battlefield —
260,000 sons, fathers, brothers and
uncles. In South Carolina alone,
21,000 men, one-third of the white
male population between 18 and
45, died. Nor was the civilian population spared,
as Sherman burned a streak through the region.
In response, the white South and white
South Carolinians shaped memories to justify
their ignoble defeat and painful loss, on both
a personal and social level. As one woman from
Georgia put it, “In the shadow of defeat and
humiliation, we needed to know that right and
justice were ours.” They needed to believe that

by Edward Pollard in 1866. Pollard’s book
was one of many in the 1860s and ’70s
that put forward four tenets about the war:

•
•
•
•

in seceding from the Union, they had acted
legally and morally.
In the first generation after the war,
Southerners rewrote the past to try to heal
what one novelist later termed the “Great
Wound.” The specific way the defeated South
reordered its past to cope with its present came
to be called the “Lost Cause.” The term is
borrowed from the title of a book written

It had been a noble cause from
the start.
Liberty, not slavery, was the reason
for secession.
Confederate soldiers had fought
bravely and lost only because of
the overwhelming numbers and
resources of the Yankees.
Slaves and white women on the
home front had remained loyal
to the cause until the bitter end.

For the war generation, rewriting
the recent past proved helpful and maybe
necessary on a psychological level.
The idea of the Lost Cause helped lift
the spirits of the South at a time when
so much physical work was needed to rebuild
the region. Former Civil War generals, such
as Jubal Early, were particularly active in
promoting the Lost Cause in memoirs and
history books. Those with personal memories
of the war were defiant toward Yankees,
Republicans and the federal government,
and were not inclined toward reconciliation.

Regional Revisionism
THE SOMBER AND STEADFAST TONE of

the first iteration of the Lost Cause in the 1860s
and ’70s was very different from the celebratory
tenor that emerged around 1900 — and that
was echoed at the Charleston gala in 2010.
Reconstruction had ended by the turn
of the century, and Southerners with personal
memories of the war were giving way to the sons
and daughters of veterans. The new generation
reconfirmed the tenets of the Lost Cause, but
replaced the feeling of defiant justification with
one of celebration of the Confederacy and
reconciliation with the North.
The economic and political reunion of
North and South that took place after 1877

was mirrored in a revision in perspectives on
the war in both regions. In the North, at a time
of rising nationalism confirmed by the War of
1898, the meaning and memory of the Civil War
shifted emphasis, from an effort to emancipate
the slaves toward a quest to save the Union.
Because this new theme downplayed slavery,
it left the Lost Cause unchallenged and invited
both sides to celebrate the valor of the troops in
the field. In the process, the Northern memory
of the war as an emancipationist effort was forgotten by all but a few African-American leaders,
such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Frederick Douglass.
Indeed, this “reunification” of North and
South came about at the expense of blacks.

In the 1890s the South, with both the tacit and
active endorsement of the federal government,
evaded the 14th and 15th amendments, which
had been ratified to protect African-American
civil and voting rights. In 1896, Plessy v.
Ferguson upheld the South’s Jim Crow laws that
discriminated against African Americans, and
beginning in the 1890s Congress perennially
consigned an anti-lynching bill to defeat. The
meaning of freedom for former slaves and their
descendants was left for the defeated white
South, not the victorious North, to decide.
As the nation solidified in law the status
of blacks, Confederate heritage groups across the
South also institutionalized the Lost Cause in
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history books, school curricula and monuments
to the dead.
Three groups stand out. The United
Confederate Veterans, founded in 1889, were
former soldiers who promoted the Lost Cause
mostly at reunions that continued well into
the 20th century. The United Daughters of
the Confederacy, founded in 1894, and the
Sons of Confederate Veterans, founded in
1896, were even more determined than the
veterans themselves to make concrete and
permanent the memory of the war and the
sacrifice of their ancestors. Between 1894
and 1911 (the 50th anniversary of the start
of the war), the UDC and the SCV sponsored
pageants, parades and commemorations, and
built what is today the most lasting legacy

THE EVENTS surrounding the 100th anniversary

of their efforts — monuments and statues to
the Confederate cause that dot the Southern
landscape from Virginia to Texas.
Perhaps a more powerful effort to promote
the Lost Cause was what Confederate heritage
groups called the “true history” movement, an
organized push to write, publish and regulate the
history of the Civil War and the Confederacy.
From 1900 to 1915 or so, through the work of the
UDC and a host of affiliated women’s clubs, the
tenets of the Lost Cause became a catechism and
a creed against which books, speeches, lectures
and classroom lessons were measured. Teachers,
authors and politicians were scrutinized to
see if they conveyed the proper message about
secession and the war, as well as the correct
narratives of loyal slaves and steadfast soldiers.

of the Civil War in 1961 illustrate the unpredictable
relationship among popular memory, historical
scholarship and contemporary culture.
In 1960 and 1961, careful plans for a unifying
and non-controversial national centennial commemoration were disrupted by sweeping changes in the South generated by the civil rights
movement. The modern fight for equality demanded a reconsideration
of the Lost Cause and national reconciliation interpretations of the war.
In 1957, in the midst of the civil rights movement and at the
height of the Cold War, Congress authorized a Civil War Centennial
Commission, with 21 white appointees led by retired Gen. Ulysses
S. Grant III, the grandson of the Union general. The commission
was given money but no real power; it was conceived as an umbrella
group over state commissions, which would actually carry out the
commemorative events. As a result, the CWCC depended upon state
commissions in the South controlled by adherents to the Lost Cause,
who had found renewed strength and purpose in combating the push
for civil rights.
President Dwight Eisenhower, imbued with the spirit of the Cold
War, had saddled Grant and the CWCC with a mandate to emphasize
the unity of the nation and thereby show the world that the United
States stood firm and united in the face of the communist threat.
Grant, determined to follow Ike’s orders and to pull the Southern
commissions on board, made a conscious decision to shape the
themes of the centennial in favor of states’ rights, the Lost Cause
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The Lost Cause and its Northern
counterpart, a war for reunification, remained
the predominant historical “memories” into the
middle of the 20th century. Although individual
historians, such as David Duncan Wallace, took
issue with some particulars of the Lost Cause, the
broad trends in the interpretation and writing of
academic history did little to challenge popular
perceptions of the war.
Nor were the dominant narratives
challenged much by cultural and historical
trends. African Americans remained secondclass citizens at mid-century. However, both
the memory of emancipation and the place
of blacks in contemporary American society
were about to change.

and a fight to save the Union — and to essentially
ignore emancipation.
What some might have considered a sound
decision in 1957 looked very different by the spring
of 1961, when the CWCC, the nation and South
Carolina prepared to commemorate the war’s 100th anniversary. Between
1957 and 1961 Eisenhower was forced to send troops to desegregate Little
Rock’s Central High, and subsequent federal court decisions began the
desegregation of the South.
With the question of African-Americans’ freedom and citizenship
in the headlines and in the minds of the nation, the CWCC planned
to hold its convention at the segregated Fort Sumter Hotel in Charleston.
When the management of the hotel refused a reservation request from
a black member of the New Jersey state centennial commission, the
Northern state commissions threatened a boycott.
U.S. Grant held firm against the Northern states’ protest. However,
newly inaugurated president John F. Kennedy intervened, and in one
of the first decisions of his presidency he moved the CWCC convention
to cramped quarters at the nearby Charleston Naval Base. The episode
proved a public relations disaster for the CWCC, and the official
national commemoration never recovered. Grant resigned and was
replaced by Columbia University historian Allen Nevins, who insisted
on a thematic balance that included emancipation, slavery and a
counter-narrative to the Lost Cause. In response, the Southern commissions repeated history, seceding from the national commemoration
to hold their own centennial celebrations.

Still A Dangerous!
Battleground
TODAY the sesquicentennial
events have begun. Once again
we renew our interest in a war
whose first shots were fired
150 years ago.
Since the 1961 centennial,
countless books, films, documentaries and commentaries have
emerged to further our understanding — and, in some
cases, to further obscure our
understanding — of an era
when the nation was divided
against itself. In the four
years to come, we can expect
hundreds of public events
across the South and nation
— re-enactments, symposia,
exhibits, films and plays —
that will shape the historical
memory and meaning of the
war for a new generation.
And with the past as our
guide, we can expect contemporary issues, needs and
circumstances to weave their
way into those upcoming
commemorations, most likely
in ways that will stir emotions,
awaken regional biases and open old wounds.
It is telling that both the Obama administration and
Congress have refrained from funding or appointing a national
commission for the sesquicentennial. In deciding against
a national commission, perhaps our current leaders are bowing
to the present circumstances of fiscal austerity.
Then again, they don’t need the difficult lessons of the
centennial in Charleston to remind them that the memory
of the Civil War remains a dangerous battleground — even
as the shooting recedes farther into the past. |F|
The author, a 1982 graduate, has been a history professor at Furman
since 1987. Illustrations from North Wind Picture Archives.
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history books, school curricula and monuments
to the dead.
Three groups stand out. The United
Confederate Veterans, founded in 1889, were
former soldiers who promoted the Lost Cause
mostly at reunions that continued well into
the 20th century. The United Daughters of
the Confederacy, founded in 1894, and the
Sons of Confederate Veterans, founded in
1896, were even more determined than the
veterans themselves to make concrete and
permanent the memory of the war and the
sacrifice of their ancestors. Between 1894
and 1911 (the 50th anniversary of the start
of the war), the UDC and the SCV sponsored
pageants, parades and commemorations, and
built what is today the most lasting legacy

THE EVENTS surrounding the 100th anniversary

of their efforts — monuments and statues to
the Confederate cause that dot the Southern
landscape from Virginia to Texas.
Perhaps a more powerful effort to promote
the Lost Cause was what Confederate heritage
groups called the “true history” movement, an
organized push to write, publish and regulate the
history of the Civil War and the Confederacy.
From 1900 to 1915 or so, through the work of the
UDC and a host of affiliated women’s clubs, the
tenets of the Lost Cause became a catechism and
a creed against which books, speeches, lectures
and classroom lessons were measured. Teachers,
authors and politicians were scrutinized to
see if they conveyed the proper message about
secession and the war, as well as the correct
narratives of loyal slaves and steadfast soldiers.

of the Civil War in 1961 illustrate the unpredictable
relationship among popular memory, historical
scholarship and contemporary culture.
In 1960 and 1961, careful plans for a unifying
and non-controversial national centennial commemoration were disrupted by sweeping changes in the South generated by the civil rights
movement. The modern fight for equality demanded a reconsideration
of the Lost Cause and national reconciliation interpretations of the war.
In 1957, in the midst of the civil rights movement and at the
height of the Cold War, Congress authorized a Civil War Centennial
Commission, with 21 white appointees led by retired Gen. Ulysses
S. Grant III, the grandson of the Union general. The commission
was given money but no real power; it was conceived as an umbrella
group over state commissions, which would actually carry out the
commemorative events. As a result, the CWCC depended upon state
commissions in the South controlled by adherents to the Lost Cause,
who had found renewed strength and purpose in combating the push
for civil rights.
President Dwight Eisenhower, imbued with the spirit of the Cold
War, had saddled Grant and the CWCC with a mandate to emphasize
the unity of the nation and thereby show the world that the United
States stood firm and united in the face of the communist threat.
Grant, determined to follow Ike’s orders and to pull the Southern
commissions on board, made a conscious decision to shape the
themes of the centennial in favor of states’ rights, the Lost Cause
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The Lost Cause and its Northern
counterpart, a war for reunification, remained
the predominant historical “memories” into the
middle of the 20th century. Although individual
historians, such as David Duncan Wallace, took
issue with some particulars of the Lost Cause, the
broad trends in the interpretation and writing of
academic history did little to challenge popular
perceptions of the war.
Nor were the dominant narratives
challenged much by cultural and historical
trends. African Americans remained secondclass citizens at mid-century. However, both
the memory of emancipation and the place
of blacks in contemporary American society
were about to change.

and a fight to save the Union — and to essentially
ignore emancipation.
What some might have considered a sound
decision in 1957 looked very different by the spring
of 1961, when the CWCC, the nation and South
Carolina prepared to commemorate the war’s 100th anniversary. Between
1957 and 1961 Eisenhower was forced to send troops to desegregate Little
Rock’s Central High, and subsequent federal court decisions began the
desegregation of the South.
With the question of African-Americans’ freedom and citizenship
in the headlines and in the minds of the nation, the CWCC planned
to hold its convention at the segregated Fort Sumter Hotel in Charleston.
When the management of the hotel refused a reservation request from
a black member of the New Jersey state centennial commission, the
Northern state commissions threatened a boycott.
U.S. Grant held firm against the Northern states’ protest. However,
newly inaugurated president John F. Kennedy intervened, and in one
of the first decisions of his presidency he moved the CWCC convention
to cramped quarters at the nearby Charleston Naval Base. The episode
proved a public relations disaster for the CWCC, and the official
national commemoration never recovered. Grant resigned and was
replaced by Columbia University historian Allen Nevins, who insisted
on a thematic balance that included emancipation, slavery and a
counter-narrative to the Lost Cause. In response, the Southern commissions repeated history, seceding from the national commemoration
to hold their own centennial celebrations.

Still A Dangerous!
Battleground
TODAY the sesquicentennial
events have begun. Once again
we renew our interest in a war
whose first shots were fired
150 years ago.
Since the 1961 centennial,
countless books, films, documentaries and commentaries have
emerged to further our understanding — and, in some
cases, to further obscure our
understanding — of an era
when the nation was divided
against itself. In the four
years to come, we can expect
hundreds of public events
across the South and nation
— re-enactments, symposia,
exhibits, films and plays —
that will shape the historical
memory and meaning of the
war for a new generation.
And with the past as our
guide, we can expect contemporary issues, needs and
circumstances to weave their
way into those upcoming
commemorations, most likely
in ways that will stir emotions,
awaken regional biases and open old wounds.
It is telling that both the Obama administration and
Congress have refrained from funding or appointing a national
commission for the sesquicentennial. In deciding against
a national commission, perhaps our current leaders are bowing
to the present circumstances of fiscal austerity.
Then again, they don’t need the difficult lessons of the
centennial in Charleston to remind them that the memory
of the Civil War remains a dangerous battleground — even
as the shooting recedes farther into the past. |F|
The author, a 1982 graduate, has been a history professor at Furman
since 1987. Illustrations from North Wind Picture Archives.
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